Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany.

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air (131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. The sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

Simulating the mesoscale transport of krypton-85.

Due to its half-life, chemical inertness and low solubility in water, radioactive 85Kr is a valuable tracer for testing the performance of atmospheric dispersion models in simulating long-range transport of pollutants. This paper evaluates the capability of simulating the dispersion of radiokrypton emitted by a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in north-west France. Three time periods during which elevated activity concentrations of 85Kr in ground level air were detected in south-west Germany are chosen. Simulations have been performed using the HYSPLIT code and the European Centre for Median-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) data base. Although their results show a slight trend of underestimating the measured 85Kr concentrations, there is a significant correlation and moderate scatter between observations and simulations with about 50% of the results being within a factor of two of the measured concentrations. The simulated travel time distributions provided a valuable tool for providing additional insight into the dispersion of the tracer radionuclides and for identifying potential causes of deviations between measured and calculated concentrations.

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward. An understanding of natural and man-made radionuclide backgrounds can be used in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (such as event screening criteria in Annex 2 to the Protocol of the Treaty) for the effective implementation of the verification regime. Fission-based production of (99)Mo for medical purposes also generates nuisance radioxenon isotopes that are usually vented to the atmosphere. One of the ways to account for the effect emissions from medical isotope production has on radionuclide samples from the IMS is to use stack monitoring data, if they are available, and atmospheric transport modeling. Recently, individuals from seven nations participated in a challenge exercise that used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of (133)Xe concentration measurements at the IMS radionuclide station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well. A model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in understanding how to discriminate those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

Update and improvement of the global krypton-85 emission inventory.

Krypton-85 is mainly produced in nuclear reactors by fission of uranium and plutonium and released during chopping and dissolution of spent fuel rods in nuclear reprocessing facilities. As noble gas it is suited as a passive tracer for evaluation of atmospheric transport models. Furthermore, research is ongoing to assess its quality as an indicator for clandestine reprocessing activities. This paper continues previous efforts to compile a comprehensive historic emission inventory for krypton-85. Reprocessing facilities are the by far largest emitters of krypton-85. Information on sources and calculations used to derive the annual krypton-85 emission is provided for all known reprocessing facilities in the world. In addition, the emission characteristics of two plants, Tokai (Japan) and La Hague (France), are analysed in detail using emission data with high temporal resolution. Other types of krypton-85 sources are power reactors, naval reactors and isotope production facilities. These sources contribute only little or negligible amounts of krypton-85 compared to the large reprocessing facilities. Taking the decay of krypton-85 into account, the global atmospheric inventory is estimated to about 5500 PBq at the end of 2009. The correctness if the inventory has been proven by meteorological simulations and its error is assumed to be in the range of a few percent.